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Abstract
We study a linear price impact model including other liquidity takers, whose flow of orders follows
a Hawkes process. The optimal execution problem is solved explicitly in this context, and the closed-
formula optimal strategy describes in particular how one should react to the orders of other traders. This
result enables us to discuss the viability of the market. It is shown that Poissonian arrivals of orders
lead to quite robust Price Manipulation Strategies in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl [29]. Instead, a
particular set of conditions on the Hawkes model balances the self-excitation of the order flow with the
resilience of the price, excludes Price Manipulation Strategies and gives some market stability.
Keywords: Market Impact Model, Optimal Execution, Hawkes Processes, Market Microstructure,
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1 Introduction
When modeling the price of an asset, we typically distinguish at least three different time scales. At the
low-frequency level, the price can often be well approximated by a diffusive process. At the other end,
when dealing with very high frequencies, some key features of the Limit Order Book (LOB) dynamics have
to be modeled. In between, price impact models consider an intra-day mesoscopic time scale, somewhere
between seconds and hours. They usually ignore most of the LOB events (limit orders, cancellations, market
orders, etc.) and focus on describing the price impact of the transactions. Their goal is to be more tractable
than high-frequency models and to bring quantitative results on practical issues such as optimal execution
strategies. The usual setup is well-described in Gatheral [22], who defines the price process S as
St = S0 +
∫ t
0
f(x˙s)G(t− s)ds+
∫ t
0
σdZs,
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where x˙s is the rate of trading of the liquidating agent at time s < t, f(v) represents the instantaneous price
impact of an agent trading at speed v, G is called a “decay kernel” and Z is a noise process. The quantity
f(v)G(+∞) is usually called the “permanent impact”, f(v)G(0) the “immediate impact” and f(v)[G(0+) −
G(+∞)] the “transient impact”. The pioneering price impact models of Bertsimas and Lo [10] and Almgren
and Chriss [5] consider a linear impact, with an immediate and a permanent part (which corresponds to
f(v) = αv, G(0) > 0, G(0+) = G(+∞) > 0 with the previous notations). These models ignore the transient
part of the impact which is due to the resilience of the market and cannot be neglected when trading frequently.
For that purpose, Obizhaeva and Wang [32] have considered a model that includes in addition a linear
transient impact that decays exponentially (i.e. f(v) = αv, G(u) = λ+(1−λ) exp(−ρu), 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, ρ > 0).
However, empirical evidence on market data shows that the price impact is not linear but rather concave,
see e.g. Potters and Bouchaud [33], Eisler et al. [17], Mastromatteo, Tóth and Bouchaud [31], Donier [16]
and more recently, Farmer, Gerig, Lillo and Waelbroeck [19]. Extensions or alternatives to the Obizhaeva
and Wang model that include non-linear price impact have been proposed by Alfonsi, Fruth and Schied [2],
Predoiu, Shaikhet and Shreve [34], Gatheral [22] and Guéant [24] to mention a few. Similarly, the exponential
decay of the transient impact is not truly observed on market data, and one should consider more general
decay kernels. Alfonsi, Schied and Slynko [4] and Gatheral, Schied and Slynko [23] consider the extension of
the Obizhaeva and Wang model when the transient impact has a general decay kernel. Another simplification
made by these models is that they generally assume that when the liquidating trader is passive, the price
moves according to a continuous martingale, that sums up the impact of all the orders issued by other
participants. However, if one wants to use these models at a higher frequency, they would naturally wonder
how these orders (at least the largest ones) can be taken into account in the strategy, and if the martingale
hypothesis for the price can be relaxed. This is one of the contributions of the present paper.
On the other hand, high-frequency price models aim at reproducing some statistical observations made on
market data such as the autocorrelation in the signs of trades, the volatility clustering effect, the high-
frequency resilience of the price, etc., and to obtain low-frequency asymptotics that are consistent with
continuous diffusions. At very high frequencies, one then has to describe LOB dynamics, or a part of it.
Such models have been proposed by Abergel and Jedidi [1], Huang, Lehalle and Rosenbaum [28], Cont and
de Larrard [13], Garèche et al. [21], among others. However, as stressed in [13], LOB events are much more
frequent than price moves. Thus, it may be relevant to model the price at the slightly lower frequency
of midpoint price changes. For example, Robert and Rosenbaum [35] have proposed a model based on a
diffusion with uncertainty zones that trigger the price changes. Recently, Bacry et al. [6] presented a tick-
by-tick price model based on Hawkes processes, that reproduces well some empirical facts of market data.
This model has then been enriched by Bacry and Muzy [8] to describe jointly the order flow and the price
moves. In fact, there is a very recent and active literature that focuses on the use of mutually exciting
Hawkes processes in high-frequency price models. Without being exhaustive, we mention here the works of
Da Fonseca and Zaatour [14], Zheng, Roueff and Abergel [38], Filimonov and Sornette [20] and Hardiman,
Bercot and Bouchaud [25]. Asymptotic and low-frequency behaviour of such models has been investigated
recently by Bacry et al. [7] and Jaisson and Rosenbaum [30].
The present paper is a contribution to this also mutually exciting literature. Its main goal is to make a bridge
between high-frequency price models and optimal execution frameworks. On the one hand, Hawkes processes
seem to be rich enough to describe satisfactorily the flow of market orders. On the other hand, price impact
models are tractable and well-designed to calculate trading costs. The aim of our model is to grasp these
two features. Thus, we consider an Obizhaeva and Wang framework where market buy and sell orders issued
by other traders are modeled through Hawkes processes. This enables us to make quantitative calculations
and to solve the optimal execution problem explicitly. We obtain a necessary and sufficient condition on the
parameters of the Hawkes model to rule out Price Manipulation Strategies that can be seen as high-frequency
arbitrages. Interestingly, we also show that modeling the order flow with a Poisson process necessarily leads
to those arbitrages.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and present a general criterion to exclude
Price Manipulation Strategies. Section 3 summarizes our main results. Section 4 gives the solution of the
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optimal execution problem along with several comments and insights on the optimal strategy. Eventually,
we analyze the existence of Price Manipulation Strategies in our model in Section 5 and give the conditions
under which they are impossible. Cumbersome explicit formulas and technical proofs are gathered in the
Appendix.
2 Model setup and the optimal execution problem
2.1 General price model
We start by describing the price model itself, without considering the execution problem. We consider a single
asset and denote by Pt its price at time t. We assume that we can write it as the sum of a “fundamental
price” component St and a “mesoscopic price deviation” Dt:
Pt = St︸︷︷︸
fundamental price
+ Dt︸︷︷︸ .
mesoscopic price deviation
(1)
Typically, these quantities are respectively related to the permanent and the transient impact of the market
orders. We now specify the model and consider the framework of Obizhaeva and Wang [32] where these
impacts are linear. Let Nt be the sum of the signed volumes of past market orders on the book between
time 0 and time t. By convention, a buy order is counted positively in N while a sell order makes N decrease,
and we assume besides that N is a càdlàg (right continuous with left limits) process. We assume that an
order modifies the price proportionally to its size, which would correspond to a block-shaped limit order
book. A proportion ν ∈ [0, 1] of the price impact is permanent, while the remaining proportion 1 − ν is
transient with an exponential decay of speed ρ > 0. This mean-reversion effect can be seen as the feedback of
market makers, who affect the price using limit orders and cancellations. Namely, we consider the following
dynamics for S and D:
dSt =
ν
q
dNt︸︷︷︸
market orders
dDt = −ρ Dt dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
market resilience
+
1− ν
q
dNt︸︷︷︸,
market orders
with q > 0. One should note that in this model, the variations in the fundamental value of the asset are
revealed in its price through the process S. Indeed, we assume that the impact of each incoming market
order, modeled through the process N , contains of proportion ν of “real” or “exogenous” information, and
that the remaining proportion 1− ν is of endogenous origin and will vanish over time.
Remark 2.1. This model assumes a linear price impact with an exponential resilience. As mentioned in
the introduction, these assumptions are challenged by empirical facts, and it would be for sure interesting
and relevant to enrich the model by considering a non linear price impact and a more general decay of the
impact. However, the new feature of the model with respect to the literature on optimal execution is to add a
flow of market orders issued by other traders. This is why we afford to make these simplifying assumptions
that give analytical tractability, which is important to calculate the optimal execution strategy in real time.
Thus, the model is meant to constitute a first step in dynamic optimal execution with the price driven by
point processes, and we plan to confront it to market data in a future work.
As usual, we consider (Ω,F ,P) a probability space where P weights the probability of the market events. We
assume that the process (Nt)t≥0 has bounded variation and is square integrable, i.e. sups∈[0,t] E[N
2
s ] < ∞
for any t ≥ 0, and we define (Ft)t≥0 the natural filtration of N , Ft = σ(Ns, s ≤ t) for t ≥ 0. We will specify
in Section 2.3 which dynamics we consider for N in this paper.
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2.2 Optimal execution framework
We now consider a particular trader who wants to buy or sell a given quantity of assets on the time inter-
val [0, T ]. Through the paper, we will call this trader the “strategic trader” to make the distinction between
his market orders and all the other market orders, that are described by N . We will denote by Xt the number
of assets owned by the strategic trader at time t. We assume that the process is (Ft)-adapted, with bounded
variation and càglàd (left continuous with right limits) which means that the strategic trader observes all the
information available on the market, and that he can react instantly to the market orders issued by other
traders. Besides, a strategy that liquidates x0 assets on [0, T ] should satisfy X0 = x0 and XT+ = 0: x0 > 0
(resp. x0 < 0) corresponds to to a sell (resp. buy) program.
Definition 2.1. A liquidating strategy X for the position x0 ∈ R on [0, T ] is admissible if it is (Ft)-adapted,
càglàd, square integrable, with bounded variation and such that X0 = x0 and XT+ = 0, a.s.
Remark 2.2. An admissible strategy X has a countable set DX of times of discontinuity on [0, T ], and can
have a non-zero continuous part Xct = Xt −
∑
τ∈DX∩[0,t)
(Xτ+ −Xτ ), t ∈ [0, T ].
One then has to specify how the strategic trader modifies the price, as well as the cost induced by his trading
strategy. Again, we will consider the Obizhaeva and Wang model [32] with the same price impact as above.
However, we let the possibility that the proportion ǫ ∈ [0, 1] of permanent impact of the strategic trader could
be different from the one of the other traders, which we note ν ∈ [0, 1]. Of course, a reasonable choice would
be to set ǫ = ν to consider all orders equally, but the model allows for more generality. We then assume the
following dynamics
dSt =
1
q
(νdNt + ǫdXt) , (2)
dDt = −ρ Dt dt+ 1
q
((1− ν)dNt + (1− ǫ)dXt) . (3)
With the assumptions on N and X , the price processes P , S and D have left and right limits. More precisely,
in case of discontinuity at time t, (2) and (3) have to be read here as follows
St − St− = ν
q
(Nt −Nt−), St+ − St = ǫ
q
(Xt+ −Xt),
Dt −Dt− = 1− ν
q
(Nt −Nt−), Dt+ −Dt = 1− ǫ
q
(Xt+ −Xt).
For the sake of tractability only, we make the assumption of a block-shaped Limit Order Book. Thus (see [32]),
when the strategic trader places at time t an order of size v ∈ R (v > 0 for a buy order and v < 0 for a sell
order), it has the following cost
πt(v) =
∫ v
0
[
Pt +
1
q
y
]
dy = Pt v︸︷︷︸
cost at the current price
+
v2
2q︸︷︷︸
impact cost
.
Since Pt+ = Pt +
v
q
, this cost amounts to trade all the assets at the average price (Pt + Pt+)/2. We stress
here that if an order has just occurred, i.e. Nt−Nt− 6= 0, the value of Pt is different from Pt− and takes into
account the price impact of this order. Therefore, the cost of an admissible strategy X is given by
C(X) =
∫
[0,T )
Pu dXu +
1
2q
∑
τ∈DX∩[0,T )
(∆Xτ )
2 − PTXT + 1
2q
X2T (4)
=
∫
[0,T )
Pu dX
c
u +
∑
τ∈DX∩[0,T )
Pτ (∆Xτ ) +
1
2q
∑
τ∈DX∩[0,T )
(∆Xτ )
2 − PTXT + 1
2q
X2T ,
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since at time T all the remaining assets have to be liquidated. Here, the sum brings on the countable times
of discontinuity DX of X , and the jumps ∆Xτ = Xτ+ − Xτ 6= 0 for τ ∈ DX . We note that all the terms
involved in the cost function are integrable, thanks to the assumption on the square integrability of X and N .
Remark 2.3. With the initial market price P0 taken as a reference, −P0×x0 is the mark-to-market liquida-
tion cost. Thus, C(X) + P0 × x0 can be seen as an additional liquidity cost of it is positive. If it is negative,
its absolute value can be seen as the gain associated to the strategy X.
Remark 2.4. The cost defined by (4) in the price model (1), (2) and (3) is a deterministic function of
(Xt)t∈[0,T ], (Nt)t∈[0,T ], S0, D0 and the parameters q, ν, and ǫ. In this remark, we denote by C(X,N, S0, D0, q)
this function when ν and ǫ are given. From (2), (3) and (4), we have the straightforward property
C(X,N, S0, D0, q) = C(−X,−N,−S0,−D0, q). (5)
Observing that qC(X) =
∫
[0,T ) qPudXu +
1
2
∑
0≤τ<T
(∆Xτ )
2 − (qPT )XT + 12 (XT )2, and remarking that qS and
qD satisfy (2) and (3) with q = 1, we also get
qC(X,N, S0, D0, q) = C(X,N, qS0, qD0, 1). (6)
Remark 2.5. Since X is a càglàd process and N is a càdlàg process, we will have to work with làdlàg (with
finite right-hand and left-hand limits) processes. When Z is a làdlàg process, we set ∆−Zt = Zt − Zt− and
∆+Zt = Zt+−Zt the left and right jumps of Z, and Zct = Zt−
∑
0≤τ<t∆
+Zτ−
∑
0<τ≤t∆
−Zτ the continuous
part of Z. We also set ∆Zt = Zt+−Zt− and use the shorthand notation dZt = dZct +∆Zt. If dZt = dZ˜t for
some other làdlàg process Z˜, this means that dZct = dZ˜
c
t and ∆Zt = ∆Z˜t. In particular, when Z is càdlàg
and Z˜ is càglàd, this means that Zt − Zt− = Z˜t+ − Z˜t at the jump times.
Then, the optimal execution problem consists in finding an admissible strategyX that minimizes the expected
cost E[C(X)] for a given initial position x0 ∈ R. This problem for x0 = 0 is directly related to the existence
of Price Manipulation Strategies as defined below.
Definition 2.2. A Price Manipulation Strategy (PMS) in the sense of Huberman and Stanzl [29] is an
admissible strategy X such that X0 = XT+ = 0 a.s. for some T > 0 and E[C(X)] < 0.
We have the following result that gives a necessary and sufficient condition to exclude PMS.
Theorem 2.1. The model does not admit PMS if, and only if the process P is a (Ft)-martingale when
X ≡ 0. In this case, the optimal strategy XOW is the same as in the Obizhaeva and Wang [32] model. It is
given by
∆XOW0 = −
x0
2 + ρT
, ∆XOWT = −
x0
2 + ρT
, dXOWt = −ρ
x0
2 + ρT
dt for t ∈ (0, T ), (7)
and has the expected cost E[C(XOW)] = −P0x0 +
[
1−ǫ
2+ρ(T−t) +
ǫ
2
]
x20/q.
This theorem is proved in Appendix C. Similar results are standard in financial mathematics, but to the best
of our knowledge, it has not yet been formulated as such in the literature in a context with price impact
and with respect to the notion of Price Manipulation Strategies. In usual optimal execution frameworks,
the unaffected price is assumed a priori to be a martingale, which is not the case here. Note that if P is a
martingale, the optimal strategy is very robust in the sense that it does not depend on N , and is therefore
the same as the one in the Obizhaeva and Wang model [32] that corresponds to N ≡ 0 and D0 = 0. In fact,
it does not depend either on ǫ and ν, and only depends on ρ.
Theorem 2.1 indicates that suitable models for the order flow N should be such that P is, roughly speaking,
close to a martingale when the strategic trader is absent, so that arbitrage opportunities are short-lived and
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not too visible. This raises at least three questions. Which “simple” processes N can lead to a martingale
price P? Can we characterize the optimal strategy when P is not a martingale? In particular, in the latter
case, how does the optimal strategy take the market orders issued by other participants into account? In
this paper, we study these questions when N follows a Hawkes process.
Remark 2.6. The model can be generalized by adding a càdlàg (Ft)-martingale S0 to the price process P ,
i.e. if we replace (1) by Pt = St+Dt+S
0
t , with S
0
0 = 0. This does not change the optimal execution problem
since, using an integration by parts, S0 adds the following term to the cost∫
[0,T )
S0t dXt − S0TXT = S0TXT − S00X0 −
∫
[0,T )
Xt dS
0
t − S0TXT
= −
∫
[0,T )
Xt dS
0
t ,
which has a zero expected value from the martingale property. Let us note that there is no covariation between
the processes X and S0 since they do not jump simultaneously and X has bounded variations.
Remark 2.7. Similarly, when N is a càdlàg (Ft)-martingale and X is an admissible liquidating strategy for
X0 = x0, we have
E[C(X)] = E

∫
[0,T )
Du dXu +
1− ǫ
2q
∑
0≤τ<T
(∆Xτ )
2 − DTXT + 1− ǫ
2q
X2T

+ ǫ
2q
x20,
since x20 =
∫
[0,T+] d[(Xt − X0)2] = 2
∫
[0,T )(Xu − X0)dXu +
∑
0≤τ<T
(∆Xτ )
2 − 2(XT − X0)XT + X2T . When
ǫ ∈ [0, 1), we set Xǫt = (1 − ǫ)Xt and get
E[C(X)] =
1
q(1 − ǫ)E

∫
[0,T )
qDud(X
ǫ
u) +
1
2
∑
0≤τ<T
(∆Xǫτ )
2 − qDTXǫT +
1
2
(XǫT )
2

+ ǫ
2q
x20. (8)
Therefore, X is optimal if, and only if Xǫ is optimal in the model with ǫ = ν = 0, q = 1 and an incoming
flow of market orders equal to (1− ν)N .
2.3 The MIH model
2.3.1 Definitions and notations
We introduce the MIH (Mixed-market-Impact Hawkes) price model, where
Nt = N
+
t −N−t ,
the process (N+, N−) being a symmetric two-dimensional marked Hawkes process of intensity (κ+, κ−). The
process (N+, N−, κ+, κ−) is càdlàg and jumps when N jumps. We note n+(dt, dv) and n−(dt, dv) the Poisson
measures on R+×R+ associated to N+ and N− respectively, where the variable v stands for the amplitudes
of the jumps, i.e. the volumes of incoming market orders. We restrain to the case of i.i.d. unpredictable
marks of common law µ on R+, i.e. for any A ∈ B(R+) and t ≥ 0,
κ±t µ(A) = lim
h→0+
1
h
E[n±([t, t+ h], A)|Ft],
where Ft = σ (N+u , N−u , u ≤ t) = σ (Nu, u ≤ t) as defined earlier. In other words, at time t, the conditional
instantaneous jump intensity of N± is given by κ±t , and the amplitudes of the jumps are i.i.d. variables of
law µ which are independent from the past, i.e. from Ft− . We also define
mk =
∫
R+
vkµ(dv), k ∈ N,
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assuming moreover that m2 <∞. We choose the Hawkes kernel to be the exponential t 7→ exp(−βt), β ≥ 0,
so that (N+, N−, κ+, κ−) is Markovian. Thus, we set
(
κ+t
κ−t
)
=
(
κ∞
κ∞
)
+
[(
κ+0
κ−0
)
−
(
κ∞
κ∞
)]
exp(−βt)+
∫ t
0
∫
(R+)2
exp(−β(t−u))
(
ϕs(v
+/m1) ϕc(v
−/m1)
ϕc(v
+/m1) ϕs(v
−/m1)
)
.
(
n+(du, dv+)
n−(du, dv−)
)
,
where κ∞ ≥ 0 is the common baseline intensity of N+ and N−, and ϕs, ϕc : R+ → R+ are measurable
positive functions that satisfy
ιs :=
∫
R+
ϕs(v/m1)µ(dv) <∞ , ιc :=
∫
R+
ϕc(v/m1)µ(dv) <∞.
We assume besides that ∫
R+
ϕ2s (v/m1)µ(dv) <∞,
∫
R+
ϕ2c(v/m1)µ(dv) <∞
to have sups∈[0,t] E[N
2
s ] <∞, and we note that this property is automatically satisfied when ϕs and ϕc have
a sublinear growth since we have assumed m2 <∞. From the modeling point ov view, we may expect that
the functions ϕs and ϕc are nondecreasing: the larger an order is, the more other orders it should trigger.
However, we do not need this monotonicity assumption in the mathematical analysis.
Equivalently, in this Markovian setting, the intensities κ+t and κ
−
t follow the dynamics
dκ+t = −β (κ+t − κ∞) dt + ϕs(dN+t /m1) + ϕc(dN−t /m1),
dκ−t = −β (κ−t − κ∞) dt + ϕc(dN+t /m1) + ϕs(dN−t /m1), (9)
where formally,
∫ t
0 ϕs(dN
+
u /m1) =
∫ t
0
∫
R+
ϕs(v/m1) n
+(du, dv) for t ≥ 0. As pointed out in Hardiman,
Bercot and Bouchaud [25] and Bacry and Muzy [8] for instance (in a slightly different context since in our
framework, N models market orders only), a power-law Hawkes kernel is more in accordance with market
data than an exponential one. It is possible in principle to approximate a completely monotone decaying
kernel with a multi-exponential one while preserving a Markovian framework, at the cost of increasing the
dimension of the state space, see for example Alfonsi and Schied [3]. This investigation is left for future
research.
Note that N+ and N− boil down to independent composed Poisson processes in the case β = 0, ϕs = ϕc ≡ 0.
The meaning of the parameters is rather clear: κ+ and κ− are mean reverting processes, and ιs and ιc
respectively describe how a market buy order increases the instantaneous probability of buy (resp. sell)
orders. More precisely, ιs encodes both the splitting of meta-orders, and the fact that participants tend
to follow market trends (which is called the herding effect). On the other hand, ιc describes opportunistic
traders that sell (resp. buy) after a sudden rise (resp. fall) of the price. The functions ϕs and ϕc allow
respectively the self and cross-excitations in the order flow to depend on the volumes of the orders. For
instance, for constant functions ϕs ≡ ιs and ϕc ≡ ιc, the model boils down to the standard Hawkes model
where κ± makes jumps of constant size when N± jumps.
Hawkes processes have been recently used in the literature to model the price. In particular, Bacry et al. [6]
consider a similar model where N models all price moves, with ν = 1, ιs = 0 and deterministic jumps (i.e. µ
is a Dirac mass). More recently, Bacry and Muzy [8] have proposed an four-dimensional Hawkes process to
model the market buy and sell orders together with the up and down events on the price. In contrast, the
model that we study here determines the price impact of an order in function of its size. For the reader who
is not accustomed to Hawkes processes, we point the original paper [26], the paper by Embrechts et al. [18]
for an overview of multivariate marked Hawkes processes and the book of Daley and Vere-Jones [15] for a
more detailed account.
Remark 2.8. As one can see in Equation (9), the orders of the strategic trader do not impact the jump rates
κ+ and κ− (there is no dXt term), as opposed to the market orders issued by other traders. The first reason
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for this modeling choice is tractability. However, it is found empirically by Tòth et al. [37] that the main
contribution to the self-excitation of the order flow comes from the splitting effect. Each individual trader
tends to post several orders of the same nature (buy or sell) in a row, which creates auto-correlation in the
signs of trades, and this effect is significantly stronger than the mutual excitation between different traders.
Thus, it is an acceptable approximation to neglect the excitation coming from the orders of the strategic
trader. Of course, it would be nice to find in the future a tractable model that gives a unified framework for
the mutual excitation that considers equally all the market orders.
2.3.2 Stationarity and low-frequency asymptotics of the MIH model
Up to now, we have presented the MIH model without assuming stationarity. In most models featuring
Hawkes processes, stationarity is an a priori assumption, but here, we do not need it to derive the optimal
strategy. However, if one wishes to use the MIH model with constant parameters on a large time period, it
may be reasonable to consider parameters that satisfy stationarity. This is why we present here a few results
that are standard in the literature of Hawkes processes.
We consider the MIH model when the strategic trader is absent, i.e. X ≡ 0.
Proposition 2.1. The process (κ+t , κ
−
t ) converges to a stationary law if, and only if ιs + ιc < β.
Proof. We can apply the results of the existing literature on marked Hawkes processes with unpredictable
marks (for instance Hawkes and Oakes [27], Brémaud ans Massoulié [12] or Daley and Vere-Jones [15]) to
obtain that (κ+t , κ
−
t ) converges to a stationary law if the largest eigenvalue of∫
R+×R+
exp(−βt)
(
ϕs(v/m1) ϕc(v/m1)
ϕc(v/m1) ϕs(v/m1)
)
dt µ(dv) =
1
β
(
ιs ιc
ιc ιs
)
is strictly below unity. Conversely, if ιs + ιc ≥ β, we have
d
dt
E[κ+t + κ
−
t ] = 2βκ∞ + (ιs + ιc − β)E[κ+t + κ−t ] ≥ 2βκ∞
and the process cannot be stationary.
We now study the low-frequency asymptotics of the price process P in the MIH model. We consider the
sequence P
(n)
t = Pnt/
√
n for n ≥ 1. We have P (n)t = S(n)t + D(n)t , where we also set S(n)t = Snt/
√
n and
D
(n)
t = Dnt/
√
n. To study the behaviour of D(n), we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. When ιs + ιc < β, the expectation E[D
2
t ] converges to a finite positive value as t→ +∞.
The proof of this lemma is rather straightforward. We just have to calculate E[δ2t ], E[δtDt] and E[D
2
t ] and
check that these expectations converge when ιs + ιc < β. This result implies that (D
(n)
t1
, . . . , D
(n)
tk
) converges
to zero for the L2 norm for any 0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tk. This gives that the process D(n) converges to zero.
We thus focus on the convergence of S
(n)
t =
ν
q
N
+
nt
−N−
nt√
n
. If the jumps of N are bounded, i.e. µ has bounded
support, and v 7→ ϕs(v/m1) and v 7→ ϕc(v/m1) are bounded on the support of µ (which are reasonable
assumptions in practice), a straightforward adaptation of Corollary 1 of Bacry et al. [7] gives the convergence
in law of S(n) to a non-standard Brownian motion with zero drift.
3 Main results
Now that the whole framework is set up, we present the main results of the present paper.
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• The optimal execution problem can be solved explicitly in the MIH model and the optimal strategy has
still a quite simple form, see Theorem 4.1. Of course, this result relies on the assumptions of linear price
impact and exponential decay kernel, which are not in accordance with empirical facts, see for example
Potters and Bouchaud [33] and Bouchaud et al. [11]. We mention here that it would be possible to
keep an affine structure of the optimal strategy by considering complete monotone decay kernels as
in Alfonsi and Schied [3]. However, we believe that the optimal strategy is interesting at least from
a qualitative point of view, since it gives clear insights on how to react optimally to observed market
orders and on the role of the different parameters of the model.
• Price Manipulation Strategies necessarily appear when the flow of market orders is Poissonian, and they
are rather robust in the sense that they can be implemented without knowing the model parameters.
Namely, the strategy which consists in trading instantly a small proportion of the volume of each
incoming market order in the opposite direction is profitable on average, see Proposition 5.2. This
justifies to consider more elaborate dynamics for the order arrivals.
• Even in a non-Poissonian MIH setup, Price Manipulation Strategies can arise. Depending on the pa-
rameters of the model and on the size of each observed market order, one should either trade instantly
in the opposite direction to take market resilience into account, or in the same direction to take advan-
tage of the self-excitation property of Hawkes processes. However, our framework allows for a specific
equilibrium to take place, that we call the Mixed-market-Impact Hawkes Martingale (MIHM) model,
where PMS disappear.
• In the MIHM model, one has in particular ιs > ιc, ν < 1 and β = ρ, and the self-excitation property of
the order flow exactly compensates the price resilience induced by market makers. The resulting price
process is a martingale even at high frequencies, and in this case we find that the optimal strategy and
cost function are those of Obizhaeva and Wang [32]. The conditions of this model imply that if ιc = 0,
the norm ιs/β of the Hawkes kernel that symbolizes the endogeneity ratio of the market, see Filimonov
and Sornette [20], should be equal to 1− ν, i.e. the proportion of market impact which is transient.
• The fact of reacting to the market orders of other traders with instantaneous market orders can trigger
chain reactions and lead to market instability. We show that in the MIH framework, the conditions
under which it is profitable for the strategic trader to react instantaneously to other trades are quite
equivalent to the existence of PMS. Although the model is clearly a simplified view of the market, it is
remarkable to obtain in this case such a clear connection between market stability and free profits. It
would be interesting for further reasearch to investigate if this conclusion still holds in a more general
model.
4 The optimal strategy
We need to introduce some notations to present the main results on the optimal execution. Instead of working
with κ+t and κ
−
t , we will rather use δt = κ
+
t − κ−t and Σt = κ+t + κ−t that satisfy from (9)
dδt = −β δt dt + dIt , dΣt = −β (Σt − 2κ∞) dt + dIt, (10)
where
It =
∫ t
0
[
(ϕs − ϕc)(dN+u /m1)− (ϕs − ϕc)(dN−u /m1)
]
,
It =
∫ t
0
[
(ϕs + ϕc)(dN
+
u /m1) + (ϕs + ϕc)(dN
−
u /m1)
]
. (11)
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The processes I and I are càdlàg processes which describe intensity jumps, and their jump times are those
of N . In the standard Hawkes framework where ϕs and ϕc are constant, one has ϕs ≡ ιs and ϕc ≡ ιc, and
when N jumps, I jumps of (ιs − ιc) sgn(∆Nt) and I of ιs + ιc.
We note (τi)i≥1 the ordered random jump times of N and set τ0 = 0. For t ∈ [0, T ], we also note χt the total
number of jumps of I that occurred between time 0 and time t. From (10), we have
δt = δ0 exp(−βt) +
χt∑
l=1
exp(−β(t− τl))∆Iτl = δ0 exp(−βt) + exp(−βt) Θχt ,
where we define Θ0 = 0 and
Θi =
i∑
l=1
exp(βτl)∆Iτl =
∑
0<τ≤τi
exp(βτ) ∆Iτ , i ≥ 1.
For i ≥ 0 and t ∈ [τi, τi+1), we obtain that δt exp(βt) = δ0+Θi only depends on t through the integer i = χt.
We introduce the useful quantities
α = ιs − ιc, η = β − α,
and the two continuously differentiable functions ζ, ω : R→ R+ defined by
ζ(0) = 1 and ∀y 6= 0, ζ(y) = 1− exp(−y)
y
, (12)
ζ′(0) = −1/2 and ∀y 6= 0, ζ′(y) = (1 + y) exp(−y)− 1
y2
=
exp(−y)− ζ(y)
y
,
ω(0) = 1/2 and ∀y 6= 0, ω(y) = exp(−y)− 1 + y
y2
=
1− ζ(y)
y
, (13)
ω′(0) = −1/6 and ∀y 6= 0, ω′(y) = 2(1− exp(−y))− y(1 + exp(−y))
y3
=
2ζ(y)− 1− exp(−y)
y2
.
Both functions non-increasing, diverge to +∞ at negative infinity and vanish at positive infinity. Let us now
enounce the main theorem for the optimal execution problem.
Theorem 4.1. Let ǫ ∈ [0, 1). The optimal strategy X∗ that minimizes the expected cost E[C(X)] among
admissible strategies that liquidate x0 assets is explicit. It is a linear combination of (x0, D0, δ0, I, N) and
can be written as
X∗ = XOW +Xtrend +Xdyn,
where
• XOW is the optimal strategy in the Obizhaeva and Wang [32] model, given by (7) in Theorem 2.1,
• Xtrend is the “trend strategy”, given by (19).
• Xdyn is the “dynamic strategy”, given by (20).
The strategy XOW is a linear function of x0, X
trend is a linear function of (D0, δ0) while X
dyn is a linear
function of the processes I and N . The discontinuity times of Xdyn are those of N , and if N jumps at time
τ ∈ (0, T ), we have
(1−ǫ)∆Xdynτ =
1 + ρ(T − τ)
2 + ρ(T − τ)
{
m1
ρ
∆Iτ − (1− ν) ∆Nτ
}
+
m1
2ρ
(νρ−η)ρ(T − τ)
2 × ω(η(T − τ))
2 + ρ(T − τ) ∆Iτ . (14)
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All explicit formulas are given in Appendix A. The value function of the problem is given by
q × C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = −q(z + d)x +
[
1− ǫ
2 + ρ(T − t) +
ǫ
2
]
x2 +
ρ(T − t)
2 + ρ(T − t)
[
qd− Gη(T − t) δm1
ρ
]
x
− 1
1− ǫ ×
ρ(T − t)/2
2 + ρ(T − t)
[
qd− Gη(T − t) δm1
ρ
]2
+ cˆη(T − t)
(
δm1
ρ
)2
+ e(T − t) Σ + g(T − t),
where for u ∈ [0, T ],
Gη(u) = ζ(ηu) + νρu ω(ηu),
cˆη(u) =
1
1− ǫ × (η − νρ)
2 ρu
3
8
ω′(ηu)ζ(ηu).
The functions e and g are the unique solution of the differential equations (32) and (33) with e(0) = g(0) = 0.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix B. Let us mention here that the functions e and g admit explicit
forms by the mean of the exponential integral function, that are very cumbersome. They can be obtained
by using a formal calculus software such as Mathematica. Since they do not play any role to determine the
optimal strategy and require several pages to be displayed, we do not give these explicit formulas. Note that
they are simpler in the case η = 0, for which the explicit formulas are given by Equations (38) and (39).
The optimal strategy X∗ is illustrated on Figure 1 for two different sets of parameters. It is worth to notice
that the strategy is linear with respect to x0, D0, δ0, I and N . This property is due to the affine structure of
the model and the quadratic costs. In particular, the reaction of the optimal strategy to the other trades does
not depend on x0. The strategy X
trend is the part of the strategy which is proportional to D0 and δ0 and
thus takes advantage of temporary price trends that are known at time 0. The strategy Xdyn is proportional
to the processes I and N and describes the optimal reactions to observed price jumps. Last, let us stress
that having an explicit formula for the optimal strategy is an important feature to use it in practice. Since
the strategy reacts to each market order (or at least to those which trigger price moves), its computation
time should be significantly lower than the typical duration between two of these orders.
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(b) ρ = 16
Figure 1: Optimal strategy in the Hawkes model, in black, for q = 100, T = 1, β = 20, ιs = 16, ιc =
2, κ∞ = 12, ǫ = 0.3, ν = 0.3, D0 = 0.1, κ+0 = κ
−
0 = 60, m1 = 50, X0 = −500, µ = Exp(1/m1), ϕs(y) =
1.2 × y0.2 + 0.5 × y0.7 + 14.4 × y, ϕc(y) = 1.2 × y0.2 + 0.5 × y0.7 + 0.4 × y for all y > 0. The strategy of
the Obizhaeva and Wang model is given in blue as a benchmark, and the jumps of (Nt) are plotted in green
(with the same trajectory for the two graphs). On the left graph, ιs < β < ρ and the strategy is based on
mean-reversion: each time N jumps, X jumps in the opposite direction. On the right graph, ρ = ιs < β and
the strategy is trend-following.
Let us make some comments on the optimal strategy, and more precisely on how the strategic trader reacts
to the orders issued by other traders. First, we observe from (20) that the block trades that immediately
follow jumps of N are then compensated by the continuous trading rate. When ϕs = ϕc, we have I ≡ 0
and these block trades, as given by (14), are always opposed in sign to the market orders that they follow.
For general functions ϕs and ϕc, the signs of these trades depend on the size of the last preceding jumps of
N . For example, in the case where η = νρ, the strategic trader makes a trade in the opposite direction if
|dNt| > m1ρ(1−ν) (ϕs − ϕc)(|dNt|/m1), but trades in the same way otherwise. The same conclusion holds for
any parameter value when T − t→ 0 since ρ(T − t)2×ω(η(T − t)) vanishes. We now consider the asymptotics
when the trading horizon is large: in this case, it is reasonable to assume that η > 0 which is required to get
stationary intensities κ+ and κ−, see Section 2.3.2. Then, when T − t→ +∞, the jump part of Xdyn given
by (14) can be well approximated by
m1
2ρ
(
1 +
νρ
η
)
dIt − (1 − ν) dNt.
Therefore, the strategic trader makes a trade in the opposite direction if |dNt| > m12ρ(1−ν) (1 + νρη )(ϕs −
ϕc)(|dNt|/m1) and trades in the same direction otherwise. In the case ιc = 0 and ϕs ≡ ιs where there is
only volume-independent self-excitation, we can interpret this behavior as follows: if a market buy order is
relatively small, it may be a part of a big split order, and thus be followed by other buy orders that will make
the price go up, and the strategic trader has interest to follow this trend. However, if a market buy order is
relatively big, the price resilience effect is likely to dominate and the strategic trader has interest to trade in
the opposite way.
Last, it is interesting to notice that the optimal strategy only depends on (ϕs, ϕc) through ϕs−ϕc. This key
self-excitation function tunes the way that the strategic trader should react to other market orders.
Remark 4.1. The MIH model with η = 0 includes the particular case of independent Poisson processes when
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β = 0 and ϕs = ϕc ≡ 0. In that case, if N jumps at time τ ∈ (0, T ), we get from (14)
(1 − ǫ)∆Xdynτ = −
1 + ρ(T − τ)
2 + ρ(T − τ) × (1− ν) ∆Nτ .
Since the self-excitation effect is removed, the price is a mean-reverting process when the strategic trader is
passive. Thus, each time a market order is observed, the optimal strategy consists in posting immediately a
market order in the opposite direction, to arbitrage the resilience of the price. Such an obvious Price Manip-
ulation Strategy is unrealistic, therefore modeling the order flow with Poisson processes is not satisfactory.
We refer to Section 5.2 for more details.
Remark 4.2. Following Remark 2.3, a natural question is to look at the quantity x0 that minimizes E[C(X)]+
P0 × x0, i.e. the expected liquidation cost with respect to the mark-to-market value. From Theorem 4.1 we
obtain easily that, at time 0, this quantity is minimal for
x∗0 =
ρT [qD0 − Gη(T ) δ0m1ρ ]
2
(
1 + ǫ2ρT
) .
We can give a simple heuristic for the sign of x∗0: when D0 ≥ 0 and δ0 ≤ 0 the price trend is negative and it
is more favorable to sell (x0 ≥ 0) since Gη is nonnegative.
5 Price Manipulation Strategies in the MIH model
In this section, we study Price Manipulation Strategies (PMS), as introduced by Definition 2.2, in the
context of the MIH model. As a matter of fact, the value function given in Theorem 4.1 can be negative
even for x0 = 0, which would constitute a PMS. We first determine necessary and sufficient conditions on the
parameters of the model to exclude such strategies. Then, we study the particular case of Poisson processes,
which may seem natural to model the order flow but allow for robust arbitrages to arise in this framework.
5.1 The Mixed-market-Impact Hawkes Martingale (MIHM) model
Theorem 2.1 gives a necessary and sufficient condition on N to exclude Price Manipulation Strategies. Here,
we apply this result to identify which parameters in the Hawkes model exclude PMS. We recall the notation
α = ιs − ιc =
∫
R+
(ϕs − ϕc)(v/m1)µ(dv),
and define the (normalized) support of µ
S(µ) = {y ≥ 0 s.t. ∀ε > 0, µ((m1 × y − ε,m1 × y + ε)) > 0}.
Proposition 5.1. The MIH model does not admit PMS if, and only if the following conditions hold
β = ρ, α = (1 − ν)ρ, ϕs(x)− ϕc(x) = αx for x ∈ S(µ) (i.e. m1I = αN), and qD0 = m1
ρ
δ0, (15)
or µ = Dirac(0) with D0 = 0. In both cases, the optimal execution strategy is given by (7).
Note that in the case µ = Dirac(m1) where all the jumps have the same size, one has S(µ) = {1} thus ϕs−ϕc
is necessarily linear on S(µ) and ∆It = α sgn(∆Nt). If moreoverm1 = 0, we have N ≡ 0 and the MIH model
does not depend any longer on the parameters α and β, that can then be fixed arbitrarily.
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Proof. From Theorem 2.1, PMS are excluded if, and only if the price P is a martingale when X ≡ 0. In this
case, we have from (1), (2), (3) and (10)
dPt = −ρDtdt+ 1
q
dNt =
1
q
(dNt − δtm1dt) +
(
m1
q
δt − ρDt
)
dt.
Therefore, P is a martingale if, and only if m1
ρ
δt = qDt P-a.s., dt a.e. This condition is equivalent to
qD0 =
m1
ρ
δ0 and qdDt =
m1
ρ
dδt. From (3) and (10), the latter condition is equivalent to
ρqDt =
m1
ρ
βδt and (1 − ν)dNt = m1
ρ
dIt.
Using (11), the second condition is equivalent to (1 − ν)ρ v = m1(ϕs − ϕc)(v/m1) for all v in the support
of µ, which implies the linearity of ϕs − ϕc on S(µ) and leads to (15). Conversely, (15) implies m1ρ δt = qDt,
and P is then a martingale.
Remark 5.1. When β = ρ, α = (1−ν)ρ, and ϕs−ϕc is linear on S(µ), we get from the previous calculations
that d(m1
q
δt − ρDt) = −ρ(m1q δt − ρDt)dt, and therefore m1q δt − ρDt converges exponentially to zero. The
condition qD0 =
m1
ρ
δ0 simply means that the model starts from this steady state.
One can also check directly that the optimal strategy and its cost given by Theorem 4.1 coincide with those
of Theorem 2.1 when (15) holds. For clear reasons, we call Mixed-Impact Hawkes Martingale (MIHM) model
the MIH model if these conditions are satisfied. Proposition 5.1 is very interesting since it makes connections
between the model parameters of the MIH model in a perfect market without PMS. First, the condition β = ρ
means that the mean-reverting action of liquidity providers compensates the autocorrelation in the signs of
the trades of liquidity takers; we thus reach a conclusion similar to Bouchaud et al. [11]. The condition
α = (1 − ν)β gives a link between the Hawkes kernel and the proportion 1 − ν of transient price impact.
When ιc = 0, α/β represents the average number of child orders coming from one market order, and is thus
equal to the proportion of endogenous orders (i.e. triggered by other orders) in the market. What we obtain
here is that this ratio should be equal to 1 − ν, which is a a priori different measure of endogeneity, since
it gives the proportion of market impact that does not influence the low-frequency price (see Section 2.3.2).
The positivity of α reflects the fact that the parameter ιc tuning opportunistic trading should be small to
avoid market instability. It is interesting to notice that if (15) holds, the stationarity condition ιs + ιc < β
derived in Section 2.3.2 is equivalent to 2ιc < νρ, which can be seen as a reasonable upper bound for ιc. Last,
we see that ϕs−ϕc should be linear. Let us recall that ϕs and ϕc encode the dependence of the self-excitation
(resp. the cross-excitation) effect on the volumes of incoming market orders. Condition (15) implies that
they should have roughly the same functional form, except for a linear part which should be stronger for ϕs.
However, we remind here that these conclusions are obtained in the MIH model and should be confronted to
market data. We leave this empirical investigation for further research.
Of course, in practice, it would be miraculous if the calibration of the MIH model on real financial data led
to parameters satisfying exactly (15). One may rather expect these parameters to be close but not exactly
equal to those of the MIHM model, for the following reasons. First, there is no guarantee that fitting a model
to a market with no PMS leads to a model with no PMS. Second, the MIH model ignores market frictions
such as the bid-ask spread and gives some advantages to the strategic trader such as the possibility to post
orders immediately after the other ones (see Stoikov and Waeber [36] for a study on the latency to execute
an order). These facts make the existence of PMS more likely in the model than in reality. Third, we know
that in practice, temporary arbitrage may exist at high frequencies. Therefore, there is no reason that fitted
parameters follow exactly the MIHM condition (15). This justifies the potential practical usefulness of the
strategy given by Theorem 4.1 to reduce execution costs when the estimated parameters deviate from the
MIHM model. Let us note that Figure 1 illustrates such a case: all the parameters satisfy (15) but ρ (which
should be equal to β = 20). The estimation of the MIH model on market data is left for future research.
The framework of the MIH model also gives some interesting insights for the characterization of the existence
of short-time arbitrages. Let us introduce the following definition.
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Definition 5.1. We say that a market admits weak Price Manipulation Strategies (wPMS) if the cost of a
liquidation strategy can be reduced by posting a block trade as an immediate response to a market order issued
by another trader.
Corollary 5.1. In the MIH model, the market does not admit wPMS if, and only if,
β = ρ, α = (1− ν)ρ and ϕs(x) − ϕc(x) = αx for x ∈ S(µ) (16)
or µ = Dirac(0).
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward from Theorem 4.1. The case µ = Dirac(0) is trivial and we consider
m1 > 0. The jump term of the strategy (14) should be equal to zero for any τ ∈ [0, T ]. By taking τ = T ,
we get that ϕs(x) − ϕc(x) = (1 − ν)ρx for x ∈ S(µ). Integrating this indentity with respect to µ leads to
α = ιs − ιc = (1 − ν)ρ. Then, from (14), we should have (νρ − η) × ρu2 × ω(ηu) = 0 for u ∈ [0, T ] which
implies νρ = η. Since η = β − α = β − (1− ν)ρ, we get β = ρ. The converse implication is obvious.
By Remark 5.1, the condition qD0 =
m1
ρ
δ0 means that the model has reached its equilibrium, which is
basically the case after some time. Therefore, the conditions that exclude wPMS and PMS in the MIH model
are quite the same. This is an interesting link between two different point of views. The condition “no PMS”
means that there is no free source of income. The condition “no wPMS” rather brings on market stability,
since it excludes trading volume coming from the response to other trades. Corollary 5.1 is a mathematical
formulation of this link in our specific model.
5.2 The Poisson model
Poisson processes are often used to model the arrival of the customers in queuing theory. It is therefore
natural to use them to model the flow of market orders, as it has been made for example by Bayraktar and
Ludkovski [9] or Cont and de Larrard [13] in different frameworks.
Here, in the Poisson model, N+ and N− are two i.i.d. independent compound Poisson processes of respective
constant jump rates κ+0 and κ
−
0 , with the same jump law µ. It is a particular case of the MIH model when
β = 0, ϕs ≡ 0 and ϕc ≡ 0, which implies η = 0. Thus, the optimal strategy and value function in this case
can be deduced from Theorem 4.1 (see also Remark 4.1).
First, let us note that the Poisson model cannot satisfy the condition (15), except in the case ρ = 0, where
there is only permanent price impact, which is not relevant in this context. Thus, we know a priori that
PMS are possible. However, we specify in what follows that a Poisson order flow creates very simple and
robust arbitrages. First, we put aside the case κ+0 6= κ−0 where the trend on the price leads to obvious PMS,
and consider now the more interesting case κ+0 = κ
−
0 , and we simply denote by κ0 the common intensity.
A natural choice to get a PMS is of course to consider the optimal strategy given by Theorem 4.1 when
liquidating x0 = 0 assets. A remarkable feature of this optimal strategy in the Poisson case is that it only
depends on the process N , and does not depend directly on the law of the jumps and their intensity. Then,
when applying the optimal strategy, mainly two quantities have to be known: qD0 and ρ. We denote by
C0(D0) the cost of the optimal strategy and obtain from Theorem 4.1 in this case:
(1− ǫ)q × C0(D0) = − ρT/2
2 + ρT
q2D20 − (1− ν)2 2κ0m2
[
T
2
− 1
ρ
ln
(
1 +
ρT
2
)]
. (17)
In fact, PMS are very robust in this framework. The following proposition shows that even if qD0 and ρ
are unknown, one can construct a such a strategy. This indicates that in our framework with a linear price
impact and an exponential resilience, compound Poisson processes are not suitable to model the order flow.
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Proposition 5.2. Let κ+0 = κ
−
0 = κ0 > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1). The following round-trip strategy Xλ0 = XλT+ = 0
defined by
Xλτ+ −Xλτ = −
1− ν
1− ǫ × λ(Nτ −Nτ−)
at each jump of N is a PMS. Its average cost is given by
E[C(Xλ)] = 2λ(1− λ)κ0m2(1 − ν)
2
q(1− ǫ)
[
1− exp(−ρT )
ρ
− T
]
< 0,
and the best choice is to take λ = 1/2.
Proof. From Remark 2.7, it is sufficient to focus on the case ν = ǫ = 0 and q = 1. In this case, we have
C(X) =
∫
[0,T )
Du dX
λ
u +
1
2
∑
0≤τ<T
(∆Xλτ )
2 − DTXλT +
1
2
(XλT )
2,
withDt = D0+
∫ t
0
exp(−ρ(t−s))dNs+
∫ t
0
exp(−ρ(t−s))dXλs . From
∫
[0,T )
DudX
λ
u = −λ
∑
0≤τ<T
[
Dτ−∆Nτ + (∆Nτ )2
]
,
we get E[
∫
[0,T )
Du dX
λ
u ] = −λE[
∑
0≤τ<T
(∆Nτ )
2] = −2λκ0m2T . Since XλT = −λNT and DT = D0 + (1 −
λ)
∫ T
0
exp(−ρ(T − s))dNs a.s., we have E[(XλT )2] = 2λ2κ0m2T and
E[−DTXλT ] = λ(1 − λ)E
[
NT
∫ T
0
exp(−ρ(T − s))dNs
]
= 2λ(1− λ)κ0m2 1− exp(−ρT )
ρ
.
This eventually yields
E[C(Xλ)] = −2λκ0m2T + λ2κ0m2T + 2λ(1− λ)κ0m2 1− exp(−ρT )
ρ
+ λ2κ0m2T
= 2λ(1− λ)κ0m2
(
1− exp(−ρT )
ρ
− T
)
.
A Explicit formulas for the optimal strategy
We use the function
L(r, λ, t) := r
∫ t
0
exp(λs)
2 + rs
ds = exp(−2λ/r)
[
E
(
λ
r
(2 + rt)
)
− E
(
2λ
r
)]
, (18)
where E(y) = − ∫ +∞−y e−uu du is the exponential integral of y, in terms of Cauchy principal value if y > 0.
Since we only consider differences E(y)−E(y′) with either y, y′ > 0 or y, y′ < 0, we will only consider proper
integrals. The function E is standard and is implemented in many packages such as the Boost C++ library.
Thus, L can be evaluated as a closed formula.
We refer to (12) and (13) for the definitions of ζ and ω.
Auxiliary functions: For 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
φη(t) =
1
2(2 + ρ(T − t))×
[
1 + exp(−η(T − t)) + νρ(T − t)ζ(η(T − t))
+
β
ρ
[2 + ρ(T − t)× {1 + ζ(η(T − t)) + νρ(T − t) ω(η(T − t))}]
]
,
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Φ0(s, t) =
[
β
ρ
+
ν
2
(
1
2
− β
ρ
)]
× exp(−βs)− exp(−βt)
β
+ (1− ν)
(
1− β
ρ
)
× exp(−βT )
ρ
× [L(ρ, β, T − s)− L(ρ, β, T − t)]
+
ν
4
[(T − s) exp(−βs)− (T − t) exp(−βt)] ,
and for η 6= 0,
Φη(s, t) =
1
2
(
1
ρ
+
ν
η
)
× [exp(−βs)− exp(−βt)]
+
exp(−βT )
2ρ
×
[
1 +
ν(ρ− 2β)
η
+
β
η
(
1− νρ
η
)]
× [L(ρ, β, T − s)− L(ρ, β, T − t)]
+
exp(−βT )
2ρ
×
[
1− νρ
η
− β
η
(
1− νρ
η
)]
× [L(ρ, α, T − s)− L(ρ, α, T − t)].
We now give the explicit formulas for the whole optimal strategy. They are valid for all η ∈ R.
Trend strategy:
(1− ǫ)∆Xtrend0 =
δ0m1
2ρ × [2 + ρT × {1 + ζ(ηT ) + νρT ω(ηT )}]− [1 + ρT ]qD0
2 + ρT
,
(1− ǫ)∆XtrendT =
δ0m1
2ρ
×
[
2 + ρT × {1 + ζ(ηT ) + νρT ω(ηT )}
2 + ρT
− 2ρ Φη(0, T )− 2 exp(−βT )
]
+
qD0
2 + ρT
, (19)
and, on (0, T ),
(1− ǫ)dXtrendt =
δ0m1
2ρ
×
[
2 + ρT × {1 + ζ(ηT ) + νρT ω(ηT )}
2 + ρT
− 2ρ Φη(0, t)− 2φη(t) exp(−βt)
]
ρdt
+
qD0
2 + ρT
ρdt.
Dynamic strategy:
(1− ǫ)∆Xdyn0 = 0,
(1− ǫ)∆XdynT = − m1
[
ΘχT Φη (τχT , T ) +
χT−1∑
i=1
Θi Φη(τi, τi+1)
]
+
∑
0<τ≤T
(1− ν) ∆Nτ
2 + ρ(T − τ)
+
m1
2ρ
×
∑
0<τ≤T
2 + ρ(T − τ) × {1 + ζ(η(T − τ)) + νρ(T − τ) ω(η(T − τ))}
2 + ρ(T − τ) ∆Iτ
− m1
ρ
ΘχT exp(−βT ), (20)
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and, on (0, T ),
(1 − ǫ)dXdynt = − m1 φη(t) Θχt exp(−βt) dt +

 ∑
0<τ≤t
(1− ν)∆Nτ
2 + ρ(T − τ)

 ρdt
+

 ∑
0<τ≤t
2 + ρ(T − τ) × {1 + ζ(η(T − τ)) + νρ(T − τ) ω(η(T − τ))}
2 + ρ(T − τ) ∆Iτ

 m1
2
dt
−
[
Θχt Φη (τχt , t) +
χt−1∑
i=1
Θi Φη(τi, τi+1)
]
ρm1 dt
+
1 + ρ(T − t)
2 + ρ(T − t)
{
m1
ρ
dIt − (1− ν) dNt
}
+
m1
2ρ
(νρ− η)× ρ(T − t)
2 × ω(η(T − t))
2 + ρ(T − t) dIt.
B Proof for the optimal control problem (results of Theorem 4.1
and Appendix A)
B.1 Notations and methodology
The jump intensity of the process (Nt) is characterized by the càdlàg Markovian process (δt,Σt) defined
by (10), taking values in R × R+. The state variable of the problem is then (Xt, Dt, St, δt,Σt), and the
control is Xt − x0, i.e. the variation of the position of the strategic trader, (Xt)t∈[0,T ] being an admissible
strategy as described in Definition 2.1. The control program is thus to minimize E [C(0, X)] over all admissible
strategies, where the cost C(t,X) of the strategy X between t and T is given by
C(t,X) =
∫
[t,T )
Pu dXu +
1
2q
∑
t≤τ<T
(∆Xτ )
2 − PTXT + 1
2q
X2T .
The final value at time t = T is the cost of a market order of signed volume ∆XT = −XT (so that
XT+ = XT +∆XT = 0). At time t, the price Pt depends on Dt and St which in turn depend on (Xu)u∈[0,t].
Let us define At the set of admissible strategies on [t, T ], with t ∈ [0, T ]. The value function of the problem
is
C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = inf
X∈At
E [C(t,X)]
with Xt = x, Dt = d, St = z, δt = δ and Σt = Σ. In order to determine analytically the value function
and the optimal control of the problem, we use the probabilistic formulation of the verification theorem. We
determine a priori a continuously differentiable function C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) and an admissible strategy X∗ and
then we verify that
Πt(X) :=
∫ t
0
Pu dXu +
1
2q
∑
0≤τ<t
(∆Xτ )
2 + C(t,Xt, Dt, St, δt,Σt) (21)
is a submartingale for any admissible strategy X , and that Πt(X
∗) is a martingale. We proceed in three
steps:
1. We define a suitable function C, and derive a set of ODEs on its coefficients which is a necessary
condition for C to be the value function of the problem.
2. We solve the set of ODEs.
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3. Using the results of the previous steps, we derive the strategy X∗ such that Πt(X∗) is a martingale.
The verification argument then yields that C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) is the value function and that X∗ is optimal.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that q = 1 by using Remark 2.4.
B.2 Necessary conditions on the value function
We search a cost function C as a generic quadratic form of the variables x, d, z, δ,Σ with time-dependent
coefficient (the variable z symbolizes the current value of the fundamental price St). As we see further, we
need C to verify ∂xC + (1 − ǫ)∂dC + ǫ ∂zC + d + z = 0 : it is thus necessary that C is a quadratic form of
(d− (1− ǫ)x), (z − ǫx), δ and Σ, plus a term −(d+ z)2/2. We define
C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = a(T − t)(d− (1 − ǫ)x)2 + 1
2
(z − ǫx)2 + (d− (1− ǫ)x)(z − ǫx) − (d+ z)
2
2
+ b(T − t) δ (d− (1− ǫ)x) + c(T − t) δ2 + e(T − t) Σ + g(T − t), (22)
with a, b, c, e, g : R+ → R continuously differentiable functions. We choose the limit condition C(T, x, d, z, δ,Σ) =
−(d+ z)x + x2/2 = 12 (d + z − x)2 − (d+ z)2/2, which is the cost of a trade of signed volume −x. We thus
have
a(0) =
1
2
, b(0) = c(0) = e(0) = g(0) = 0.
Let us note that other terms should be added in equation (22) for C to be a generic quadratic form. The five
terms
h1(T − t) (d− (1 − ǫ)x) + h2(T − t) Σ(d− (1− ǫ)x) + h3(T − t) δΣ + h4(T − t) δ + h5(T − t)(z − ǫx)
have to be equal to zero since C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = C(t,−x,−d,−z,−δ,Σ) by using Remark 2.4 and the fact
that the buy and sell orders play a symmetric role. For the term in Σ2, we checked in prior calculations that
it is necessarily associated to a zero coefficient. For ∆x ∈ R, we have
C(t, x+∆x, d+ (1 − ǫ)∆x, z + ǫ∆x, δ,Σ)− C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = −(d+ z)×∆x − (∆x)
2
2
. (23)
In what follows, we drop the dependence of C(t,Xt, Dt, St, δt,Σt) on (t,Xt, Dt, St, δt,Σt) to obtain less cum-
bersome expressions. The process C(t,Xt, Dt, St, δt,Σt) is làdlàg, and with the notations of Remark 2.5, we
have by using (23)
dC = ∂tC dt + ∂xC dXct + ∂dC
(
− ρDtdt+ (1− ǫ)dXct
)
+ ∂zC ǫdXct
− β δt ∂δC dt− β(Σt − 2κ∞) ∂ΣC dt
+
[
C(t,Xt, Dt− + (1− ν)∆Nt, St− + ν∆Nt, δt− +∆It,Σt− +∆It)− C(t,Xt, Dt− , St− , δt− ,Σt−)
]
− (Dt + St) ∆Xt − (∆Xt)
2
2
.
where we refer to (11) for the definitions of I and I. The definition of Π(X) given by (21) yields dΠt(X) =
(Dt+St)dX
c
t +(Dt+St)∆Xt+(∆Xt)
2/2+dC. We define the continuous finite variation process (AXt )t∈(0,T )
such that AX0+ = C(0, X0+ , D0+ , S0+ , δ0,Σ0) and for t ∈ (0, T )
dAXt = (Dt + St) dX
c
t + Z(t,Xt, Dt, St, δt,Σt)dt
+ ∂tC dt + ∂xC dXct + ∂dC
(
− ρDtdt+ (1− ǫ)dXct
)
+ ∂zC ǫdXct
− β δt ∂δC dt − β (Σt − 2κ∞) ∂ΣC dt,
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where, for V ∼ µ,
Z(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) :=
Σ + δ
2
× E[C(t, x, d+ (1− ν)V, z + νV, δ + (ϕs − ϕc)(V/m1),Σ + (ϕs + ϕc)(V/m1))− C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ)]
+
Σ− δ
2
× E[C(t, x, d− (1− ν)V, z − νV, δ − (ϕs − ϕc)(V/m1),Σ + (ϕs + ϕc)(V/m1))− C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ)].
Then, Π(X)−AX is a martingale (let us note that almost surely, dt -a.e. on (0, T ), Z(t,Xt, Dt− , St− , δt− ,Σt−) =
Z(t,Xt, Dt, St, δt,Σt)). This yields that Π(X) is a submartingale (resp. a martingale) iff A
X is increasing
(resp. constant). From (23), we obtain ∂xC(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ)+ (1− ǫ)∂dC(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ)+ ǫ ∂zC(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ)+
d+ z = 0, and then
dAXt =
{
∂tC − ρ Dt ∂dC + Z(t,Xt, Dt, St, δt,Σt) − β δt ∂δC − β (Σt − 2κ∞) ∂ΣC
}
dt. (24)
Given the quadratic nature of the problem, we search a process AX of the form
dAXt =
ρ
1− ǫdt×
[
j(T − t)(Dt − (1− ǫ)Xt) − Dt + k(T − t) δt
]2
, (25)
with j, k : R+ → R continuously differentiable functions, in order to obtain an non-decreasing process AX that
can be constant for a specific strategy X∗. Let us note Yt := Dt−(1−ǫ)Xt, Ξt := St−ǫXt, y := d−(1−ǫ)x,
ξ := z − ǫx. Since d+ z = y + ξ + x = ξ + d−ǫy1−ǫ , we have
∂tC(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = −a˙ y2 − b˙ δy − c˙ δ2 − e˙ Σ − g˙,
−ρd ∂dC(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = −
(
2ρa+
ρǫ
1− ǫ
)
dy +
ρ
1− ǫ d
2 − ρb δd,
−βδ ∂δC(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = −βb δy − 2βc δ2,
−β(Σ− 2κ∞) ∂ΣC(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) = −βe Σ + 2βκ∞e,
Let V ∼ µ. One has
E[(ϕs − ϕc)(V/m1)] = ιs − ιc = α , E[(ϕs + ϕc)(V/m1)] = ιs + ιc = α+ 2ιc.
Thus,
E
[C(t, x, d+ (1− ν)V, z + νV, δ + (ϕs − ϕc)(V/m1),Σ+ (ϕs + ϕc)(V/m1))− C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ)]
= a [(1− ν)2m2 + 2(1− ν)m1 y] + ν
2
2
m2 + νm1 ξ
+ ν(1− ν)m2 + νm1y + (1− ν)m1ξ − 1
2
(
m2 + 2 m1 ξ +
2m1
1− ǫ d−
2ǫm1
1− ǫ y
)
+ b [(1− ν)m1 δ + α y + α˜(1− ν)] + c [α2 + 2α δ] + (α+ 2ιc)e,
with
α˜ = E[V × (ϕs − ϕc)(V/m1)] , α2 = E[(ϕs − ϕc)2(V/m1)]. (26)
These quantities α˜ and α2 are finite by assumption. This gives
Z(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) =
(
m1 ×
[
2(1− ν)a+ ν + ǫ
1− ǫ
]
+ αb
)
δy − m1
1− ǫ δd
+ [(1− ν)m1b + 2αc] δ2
+
(
m2 ×
[
(1 − ν)2a+ ν(1− ν/2)− 1
2
]
+ α˜(1− ν)b + α2c+ (α + 2ιc)e
)
Σ,
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where we consider C as a function of the variables t, x, d, z, δ,Σ as in equation (24), and substitute d− (1− ǫ)x
by y and z − ǫx by ξ in the results. We then make the change of variables (x, d, z, δ,Σ)→ (y, d, ξ, δ,Σ), and
we identify each term of equations (24) and (25):
(Eq. dy): −
(
2ρa+ ρǫ1−ǫ
)
= − 2ρ1−ǫ j.
(Eq. y2): −a˙ = ρ1−ǫj2.
(Eq. dy) yields j = (1 − ǫ)a+ ǫ2 . We input this relation in (Eq. y2) and we have j˙ = (1 − ǫ)a˙ = −ρj2 thus
j(u) = 12+ρu since j(0) = (1− ǫ)a(0) + ǫ2 = 12 . This yields a(u) = 11−ǫ
(
1
2+ρu − ǫ2
)
with (Eq. dy).
(Eq. δy): − b˙ − βb + αb + m1 ×
[
2(1− ν)a+ ν + ǫ1−ǫ
]
= 2ρ1−ǫ jk.
(Eq. δd): − ρb − m11−ǫ = − 2ρ1−ǫk,
which yields k(u) = 1−ǫ2 b(u) +
m1
2ρ . Plugging equation (28) in (Eq. δy), we have b˙ = −(β − α)b −
2ρ
1−ǫj
(
1−ǫ
2 b+
m1
2ρ
)
+m1
[
2(1− ν)a+ ν + ǫ1−ǫ
]
, and since j/(1− ǫ) = a+ ǫ/[2(1− ǫ)], we have
b˙(u) =
[
−(β − α)− ρ2+ρu
]
b(u) + m11−ǫ × 1+νρu2+ρu .
(Eq. δ2): − c˙ − 2βc + 2αc + (1− ν)m1b = ρ1−ǫ k2.
(Eq. Σ): − e˙ − βe + (α+ 2ιc)e + m2 ×
[
(1 − ν)2a+ ν(1− ν/2)− 12
]
+ α˜(1 − ν)b + α2c = 0.
We have 2(1− ǫ)× [(1− ν)2a+ ν(1− ν/2)− 12] = 2(1− ν)2/(2 + ρu)− (1− ν)2ǫ+ ν(2− ν)(1− ǫ)− (1− ǫ),
thus
e˙(u) = −(β − α− 2ιc)e(u) + α˜(1− ν)b(u) + α2c(u) + (1−ν)
2 m2
1−ǫ ×
[
1
2+ρu − 12
]
(Eq. constant): − g˙ + 2βκ∞e = 0.
We obtain two conditions on the coefficients of the process AX
j(u) =
1
2 + ρu
, (27)
k(u) =
1− ǫ
2
b(u) +
m1
2ρ
, (28)
and the following set of necessary conditions on the coefficients of C
a(u) =
1
1− ǫ
(
1
2 + ρu
− ǫ
2
)
, (29)
b˙(u) =
[
−(β − α)− ρ
2 + ρu
]
b(u) +
m1
1− ǫ ×
1 + νρu
2 + ρu
, (30)
c˙(u) = −2(β − α) c(u) + (1− ν)m1 b(u) − ρ
1− ǫ k(u)
2, (31)
e˙(u) = −(β − α− 2ιc)e(u) + α˜(1− ν)b(u) + α2c(u) + (1− ν)
2 m2
1− ǫ ×
[
1
2 + ρu
− 1
2
]
, (32)
g˙(u) = 2βκ∞ e(u), (33)
b(0) = c(0) = e(0) = g(0) = 0.
The resolution of this set of equations determines entirely the function C(t, x, d, z, δ,Σ) defined in (22). This
is the purpose of the next step of this proof. Let us note that at this stage, we already know that the system
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given by Equations (27) to (33) admits a unique solution, and that the function C which solves the system is
the value function of the problem by using the verification argument.
B.3 Resolution of the system of ODEs
First of all, we use Equation (29) to simplify the function C. The constant term (w.r.t. the time variable t)
in equation (22) is 12 (z − ǫx)2 + (d − (1 − ǫ)x)(z − ǫx) − (d+z)
2
2 = −zx− d
2
2 − ǫdx +
[
ǫ
2 +
ǫ
2 (1− ǫ)
]
x2,
thus the sum of a(T − t)(d− (1− ǫ)x)2 and this constant term can be rewritten as
− (z + d)x +
[
1− ǫ
2 + ρ(T − t) +
ǫ
2
]
x2 − 1
1− ǫ ×
ρ(T − t)/2
2 + ρ(T − t) d
2 +
ρ(T − t)
2 + ρ(T − t) dx. (34)
We note η = β−α. To solve equation (30), we search a solution of the form b(u) = b˜(u)×exp(−ηu)/(2+ρu).
This yields ˙˜b(u) = m11−ǫ × (1 + νρu)× exp(ηu). Using the respective definitions (12) and (13) of the functions
ζ and ω, it is easy to see that for all η ∈ R,
exp(−ηu)
∫ u
0
(1 + νρs) exp(ηs) ds = uζ(ηu) + νρu2ω(ηu).
Since b˜(0) = 2b(0) = 0, we obtain
b(u) =
m1u
1− ǫ ×
ζ(ηu) + νρu ω(ηu)
2 + ρu
=
1
1− ǫ ×
ρu
2 + ρu
× m1
ρ
Gη(u), (35)
where
Gη(u) := ζ(ηu) + νρu ω(ηu).
Equation (28) then gives
k(u) =
m1
2ρ
× 2 + ρu× {1 + ζ(ηu) + νρu ω(ηu)}
2 + ρu
. (36)
The remaining functions c, e and g do not play any role to determine the optimal strategy, and their
expressions are harder to obtain. Let us first consider the case η 6= 0. After some tedious calculations, we
can show that the function c that solves (31) with c(0) = 0 is given by:
c(u) = − 1
1− ǫ ×
ρu/2
2 + ρu
×m
2
1
ρ2
Gη(u)2 − m
2
1
8(1− ǫ)ρ ×
(
1− νρ
η
)2
×uζ(ηu)× [1 + exp(−ηu)− 2ζ(ηu)] . (37)
For the functions e and g, we recall here that they admit explicit but very cumbersome formulas that can be
obtained by using a formal calculus software. In the case η = 0, the resolution of the ODEs is easier, and we
get
c(u) = − (1− ν)
2
1− ǫ ×
m21
ρ2
×
[
1
2
− 1
2 + ρu
]
− νm
2
1
ρ2(1− ǫ) ×
[(
1
2
− ν
4
)
ρu+
ν
8
ρ2u2 +
ν
48
ρ3u3
]
,
e(u) = − (1− ν)
2
1− ǫ ×
(
m2 − m1(2α˜ρ− α2m1)
ρ2
)
×
[I0(u)
2
− exp(2ιcu)
ρ
L(ρ,−2ιc, u)
]
(38)
+
ν(1 − ν)m1
2ρ2(1− ǫ) ×
(
α˜− α2m1
ρ
)
× ρ2I1(u) − α2ν
2m21
4ρ3(1− ǫ) ×
[
ρ2I1(u) + 1
2
ρ3I2(u) + 1
12
ρ4I3(u)
]
,
g(u) = −2βκ∞ × (1− ν)
2
1− ǫ ×
(
m2 − m1(2α˜ρ− α2m1)
ρ2
){I1(u)
2
− 1
2ιcρ
×
[
exp(2ιcu)L(ρ,−2ιc, u)− ln
(
1 +
ρu
2
)]}
+
βκ∞ν(1 − ν)m1
2ρ3(1− ǫ) ×
(
α˜− α2m1
ρ
)
× ρ3I2(u)− βκ∞α2ν
2m21
4ρ4(1− ǫ) ×
[
ρ3I2(u) + 1
3
ρ4I3(u) + 1
24
ρ5I4(u)
]
,
(39)
where, for p ∈ N and u ≥ 0, Ip(u) := exp(2ιcu)
∫ u
0 s
p exp(−2ιcs)ds, and α˜, α2 are defined in (26).
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B.4 Determination of the optimal strategy
The final step of the proof is to determine the strategy X∗ such that Π(X∗) is a martingale, or equivalently
such that AX
∗
is constant. Equations (25) and (27) yield
dAXt =
ρ
1− ǫdt×
[
Dt − (1− ǫ)Xt
2 + ρ(T − t) − Dt + k(T − t) δt
]2
=
ρ/(1− ǫ)
[2 + ρ(T − t)]2 dt×
[
(1− ǫ)Xt + [1 + ρ(T − t)] Dt − [2 + ρ(T − t)] k(T − t) δt
]2
.
Thus, AX
∗
is constant on (0, T ) if, and only if
a.s. , dt -a.e. on (0, T ) , (1− ǫ)X∗t = − [1 + ρ(T − t)] D∗t + [2 + ρ(T − t)] k(T − t) δt, (40)
where D = D∗ when the strategy X∗ is used by the strategic trader. Then, we characterize the strategy X∗
on [0, T ] with the three following steps:
• The initial jump ∆X∗0 of the strategy is such that (X∗, D∗) satisfies equation (40) at time t = 0+.
• The strategy X∗ on (0, T ) is obtained by differentiating equation (40).
• The final jump ∆X∗T = −X∗T closes the position of the strategic trader at time T .
We need the following lemma in the sequel.
Lemma B.1. Let φ : [0, T ]→ R be a measurable function, and for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , Φ(s, t) := ∫ t
s
φ(u) exp(−βu) du.
We then have for all t ∈ [0, T ]
∫ t
0
φ(u) δu du = δ0 Φ(0, t) + Θχt Φ (τχt , t) +
χt−1∑
i=1
Θi Φ(τi, τi+1)
Proof. The proof is straightforward since for u ∈ [χt, t], δu = δ0 exp(−βu) + exp(−βu) Θχt and for
i ∈ {0, · · · , χt − 1} and u ∈ [τi, τi+1), δu = δ0 exp(−βu) + exp(−βu) Θi.
To determine the optimal strategy, only the function k given by (36) comes into play, thus the cases η = 0
and η 6= 0 can be treated simultaneously. We also note that
d
du
[u2 ω(ηu)] = uζ(ηu) and
d
du
[u ζ(ηu)] = exp(−ηu)
hold for for all u ≥ 0 and η ∈ R. We use Equations (36) and (40) to obtain the following characterization of
the strategy X∗: a.s., dt-a.e. on (0, T ),
(1−ǫ)X∗t = − [1+ρ(T−t)] D∗t +
m1
2ρ
× [2 + ρ(T − t)× {1 + ζ(η(T − t)) + νρ(T − t) ω(η(T − t))}] δt. (41)
The initial jump of X∗ at t = 0 is such that (41) is verified for t = 0+:
(1− ǫ)(x0 +∆X∗0 ) = −[1 + ρT ] (D0 + (1− ǫ)∆X∗0 ) +
m1
2ρ
× [2 + ρT × {1 + ζ(ηT ) + νρT ω(ηT )}] δ0, (42)
which gives the initial trade at time 0 as given in Appendix A.
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We differentiate Equation (41) to get
(1− ǫ)dX∗t = ρD∗t dt − [1 + ρ(T − t)] dD∗t −
m1
2
× [1 + exp(−η(T − t)) + νρ(T − t)ζ(η(T − t))] δt dt
+
m1
2ρ
× [2 + ρ(T − t)× {1 + ζ(η(T − t)) + νρ(T − t) ω(η(T − t))}] dδt.
This yields, using dδt = −β δt dt+ dIt,
(1 − ǫ)dX∗t = ρD∗t dt − m1 φη(t) δt dt +
1 + ρ(T − t)
2 + ρ(T − t)
{
m1
ρ
dIt − (1− ν) dNt
}
(43)
+
m1
2ρ
× ρ(T − t)× {ζ(η(T − t))− 1 + νρ(T − t) ω(η(T − t))}
2 + ρ(T − t) dIt,
where for t ∈ [0, T ]
φη(t) :=
1
2
×
1 + exp(−η(T − t)) + νρ(T − t)ζ(η(T − t)) + β
ρ
[2 + ρ(T − t)× {1 + ζ(η(T − t)) + νρ(T − t) ω(η(T − t))}]
2 + ρ(T − t)
and δt = δ0 exp(−βt) +
∑
0<τ≤t
exp(−β(t− τ)) ∆Iτ . For t ∈ (0, T ),
dD∗t = −ρD∗t dt + (1− ǫ)dX∗t + (1 − ν)dNt
= − m1 φη(t) δt dt
+
(1− ν) dNt
2 + ρ(T − t) +
m1
2ρ
× 2 + ρ(T − t)× {1 + ζ(η(T − t)) + νρ(T − t) ω(η(T − t))}
2 + ρ(T − t) dIt,
and we have
D∗0+ = D0 + (1− ǫ)∆X∗0 =
D0 − (1− ǫ)x0
2 + ρT
+
m1
2ρ
× 2 + ρT × {1 + ζ(ηT ) + νρT ω(ηT )}
2 + ρT
δ0
∫
(0,t]
dD∗u = − m1
∫
(0,t]
φη(u) δu du +
∑
0<τ≤t
(1 − ν) ∆Nτ
2 + ρ(T − τ)
+
m1
2ρ
×
∑
0<τ≤t
2 + ρ(T − τ)× {1 + ζ(η(T − τ)) + νρ(T − τ) ω(η(T − τ))}
2 + ρ(T − τ) ∆Iτ .
We define Φη(s, t) :=
∫ t
s
φη(u) exp(−βu) du for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Lemma B.1 yields for t ∈ [0, T ]
∫ t
0
φη(u) δu du = δ0 Φη(0, t) + Θχt Φη (τχt , t) +
χt−1∑
i=1
Θi Φη(τi, τi+1).
We obtain the expression of D∗t for t ∈ (0, T )
D∗t =
D0 − (1 − ǫ)x0
2 + ρT
+
δ0m1
2ρ
×
[
2 + ρT × {1 + ζ(ηT ) + νρT ω(ηT )}
2 + ρT
− 2ρ Φη(0, t)
]
− m1
[
Θχt Φη (τχt , t) +
χt−1∑
i=1
Θi Φη(τi, τi+1)
]
+
∑
0<τ≤t
(1− ν) ∆Nτ
2 + ρ(T − τ)
+
m1
2ρ
×
∑
0<τ≤t
2 + ρ(T − τ)× {1 + ζ(η(T − τ)) + νρ(T − τ) ω(η(T − τ))}
2 + ρ(T − τ) ∆Iτ .
From (43), the strategy X∗ on (0, T ) is as given in Appendix A. By using again (41), we also get the final
trade at time T .
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We determine the function Φη in the case η 6= 0 (similar and simpler calculations yield the result for η = 0).
We write
exp(−η(T − t))× exp(−βt) = exp(−βT )× exp(α(T − t)),
(T − t)ζ(η(T − t))× exp(−βt) = exp(−βT )
η
× [exp(β(T − t))− exp(α(T − t))].
Thus, φη(t)× exp(β(T − t)) is equal to
β
2
(
1
ρ
+
ν
η
)
×exp(β(T−t)) +
[
1
2
+
ν(ρ− 2β)
2η
+
β
2η
(
1−
νρ
η
)]
exp(β(T − t))
2 + ρ(T − t)
+
[
1
2
−
νρ
2η
−
β
2η
(
1−
νρ
η
)]
exp(α(T − t))
2 + ρ(T − t)
,
which yields for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T ,
Φη(s, t) =
1
2
(
1
ρ
+
ν
η
)
× [exp(−βs)− exp(−βt)]
+
exp(−βT )
2ρ
×
[
1 +
ν(ρ− 2β)
η
+
β
η
(
1− νρ
η
)]
× [L(ρ, β, T − s)− L(ρ, β, T − t)]
+
exp(−βT )
2ρ
×
[
1− νρ
η
− β
η
(
1− νρ
η
)]
× [L(ρ, α, T − s)− L(ρ, α, T − t)].
with η = β − α 6= 0.
C Proof of Theorem 2.1
Let X be an admissible strategy. We introduce the following processes: SNt = S0 +
ν
q
(Nt − N0), SXt =
ǫ
q
(Xt −X0),
dDNt = −ρDNt dt+
1− ν
q
dNt and dD
X
t = −ρDXt dt+
1− ǫ
q
dXt,
with DN0 = D0 and D
X
0 = 0. Thus, we have S = S
N + SX , D = DN +DX and thus P = PN + PX , where
PN = SN +DN and PX = SX +DX . From (4), we have
C(X) =
∫
[0,T )
PNu dXu − PNT XT + COW(X),
where
COW(X) =
∫
[0,T )
PXu dXu +
1
2q
∑
0≤τ<T
(∆Xτ )
2 − PXT XT +
1
2q
X2T
is a deterministic function of X that corresponds to the cost when N ≡ 0, which is the Obizhaeva and Wang
model. We now make an integration by parts as in Remark 2.6 and get that∫
[0,T )
PNu dXu − PNT XT = −
∫
[0,T )
Xu dP
N
u .
When PN is a martingale, this term has a null expectation. Therefore, the optimal execution strategy is the
same as in the Obizhaeva and Wang model, see Gatheral, Schied and Slynko [23], Example 2.12, and there
is no PMS. Otherwise, we can find 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T such that E[PNt |Fs] and PNs are not almost surely equal.
In this case, we consider the strategy Xu = E[P
N
t − PNs |Fs]1u∈(s,t] that is a round-trip, i.e. X0 = XT+ = 0.
We then get
E
[
−
∫
[0,T )
Xu dP
N
u
]
= −E[(PNt − PNs )E[PNt − PNs |Fs]] = −E[E[PNt − PNs |Fs]2] < 0.
Since COW(cX) = c2COW(X), we can find c small enough such that E[C(cX)] = −cE[E[PNt − PNs |Fs]2] +
c2COW(X) < 0, and therefore cX is a PMS.
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